Research
Publications
[5]Guaranteeing the Global Gateway: National DFIs and the Transformation of EU Development Finance
Journal of European Integration, 2026
[4] Populism and the Politics of Aid Classification: Evidence from the OECD Development Assistance Committee
International Studies Quarterly, 2026
[3] The Institutional Politics of Development Finance: ODA's Role in Shaping Subnational DFI Investments
Review of International Organizations, 2026
Policy impact: DEval Policy Brief, cited in a German Federal Government Response to the Bundestag
[2] Examining New Donors in the OECD Development Assistance Committee
Journal of International Development, 2025
[1] Compte-rendu de Chiapello, E., Engels, A., & Gonçalves Gresse, E. (2023). Financializations of Development: Global Games and Local Experiments
Gouvernement et action publique, 2025
Working Papers
Is There a Free Lunch? Commercial Capital and Risk Appetite in Bilateral Development Finance
Under review
— Recipient of the ISA's 2026 IPE Section Best Graduate Student Paper Award
Abstract
Bilateral development finance is often theorized as distinct from private finance: less pro-cyclical and more willing to stay engaged in countries facing economic turmoil. What happens when bilateral development finance draws on private capital? I argue that the source of capital of donor institutions shapes the extent to which they provide development finance to riskier countries. Using original data on 11,833 investments extended by 14 bilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) of 14 donor countries, I show that DFIs with a larger share of commercially sourced capital cut financing substantially after sovereign credit downgrades, and more so as downgrades grow more severe. Fully publicly-sourced DFIs, by contrast, do not measurably respond to downgrades. Consistent with a mechanism where commercial shareholders seek to shield their capital from losses, the effect is concentrated in loans and equity, which expose their balance sheets, and absent for state-backed guarantees. Efforts to widen the capital base of donor institutions may increase inequality in access to development finance.
What Geopolitical Returns Does ODA Bring?
Kiel Working Paper No. 2305, 2025
Abstract
We review the literature on the political economy of foreign aid, examining the geopolitical returns generated by Official Development Assistance (ODA). Our paper identifies under which conditions donors are able to influence political and economic outcomes in recipient countries, shape their behavior in global affairs, and adjust to domestic and international challenges. Building on an emerging body of research in international development finance, we propose future directions for the study of ODA in a contested global landscape.
Media: Der Spiegel
Measuring Debt Transparency in Developing Countries: An IRT Model
Abstract
Debt transparency is essential for managing sovereign debt, but it is often hindered by political and technical constraints. This paper introduces the Princeton-NYU Debt Transparency (PNDT) measure, a standardized index of debt transparency over time and across countries. The PNDT leverages missing data from the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System using a Bayesian item response theory model. Covering 113 countries from 1994 to 2022, the index is correlated with the domestic electoral cycle, openness, financial crises, and other international political dynamics. Debt transparency is not merely a matter of technical capacity but is also a political choice made by elected officials.
Works in Progress
- Donor Identity and Citizen Evaluation of Aid Projects
Abstract
Chinese-financed development projects are often evaluated more negatively than Western ones, even where Chinese finance delivers stronger development outcomes. Existing work does not disentangle whether this “reputation deficit” reflects attitudes toward China as a funder or responses to racial identity. To determine what drives this reputation deficit, we rely on a forced conjoint experiment varying attributes of projects and their managers. We will field the survey experiment in three countries that rely heavily on Chinese financing, with a pre-test planned for September 2026. This research will contribute to growing literature showing the importance of race in shaping international relations. - Small Donors and the World Bank's IFC: Explaining Co-Financing in Development
- The U.S. Development Finance Corporation and Sponsor Firm Politics in Frontier Investment
Abstract
Development finance institutions back private firms in difficult markets with loans, guarantees, and political risk insurance. Research has concentrated on state motives and allocation, and much less on how the firms that hold public backing engage their home governments. We study the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its predecessor, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and argue that the form of backing shapes when sponsor firms lobby their home government about the host country. Direct loans make the DFC a creditor with its own incentives to monitor the investment, giving sponsor firms little reason to increase political engagement after the award. Guarantees and insurance instead create contingent public commitment whose consequences depend on later events, thus increasing sponsor firms' incentives to seek home government support when host country risks emerge. Linking OPIC and DFC project records to federal lobbying disclosures in a firm-country-year panel covering 54 sponsor firms from 2000 to 2021, we find that lobbying on the host country rises about tenfold after a guarantee or insurance award and shows no detectable change after a direct loan. Loan sponsors are often engaged on the host country before the award, and prior lobbying on a country raises the odds of a direct loan there about fivefold. The findings shift the study of development finance from the allocation of public backing to the political relationship it creates. They also show how the design of public commitments can shape corporate political activity and the politics around private investment in recipient countries. - Development Dividends: The Politics of Revenue Distribution from DFI Investments
Policy Writings
Assessing the Additionality of Development Finance Institutions
OECD-DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, 2025
Report on the ODA-Eligibility of Private Sector Instruments Extended in Developing Countries
OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2024
Stocktake and Revised Methodology on the Peer Reviews on Development Finance Statistics
OECD-DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics, 2024